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des Etages: Grumet v Pataki

ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION

US. CONST. amend I.
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishmentof religion...
N.Y CoNST. art.X, § 3:
Neither the state not any subdivision thereofshall
use its property or credit or any public money, or authorize or
permit either to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or
maintenance.., of any school or institution of learningwholly or
in part' under the control or direction or any religious
denomination, or in which any denominationaltenet or doctrine is
taught, but the legislature may provide for the transportationof
childrento andfrom any school or institution of learning.

COURT OF APPEALS
Grumet v. Pataki'
(decided May 11, 1999)
The plaintiffs, Louis Grumet and Caroline Shipley, citizen
taxpayers, attacked the constitutionality of Chapter 390 of the
Laws of 1997 (hereinafter Chapter 390) under the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The -plaintiffs alleged that Chapter 390, which, in effect, provides
forthe creation of a separate public school district for a particular

93 N.Y.2d 677 (1999), 720 N.E.2d 66 (N.Y. 1999), 697 N.Y.S.2d 846
(1999).
1
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religious community, has the impermissible effect of advancing
religion.2
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Appellate Division holding that Chapter 390 violates the
Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution.3 Although
facially neutral, the statute operates to benefit a narrow religious
class rather than a broad spectrum of classes, and, therefore, ran
afoul of fundamental neutrality principles.4 The New York Court
of Appeals held that Chapter 390 constituted an impermissible
religious accommodation. 5 The court found it unnecessary to
address whether the statute violated the New York State
Constitution.6
Kiryas Joel, a village inhabited exclusively by Satmar Hasidic
Jews who live in Orange County New York, educated its children
in two parochial schools, the United Talmudic Academy for boys
and Bais Rochel for girls.7 Neither school provided services for
handicapped children even though they were entitled to such
services under State and Federal law.8 Prior to 1985, public school
teachers from the Monroe-Woodbury Central School district,
within which the parochial schools were located, provided special
educational services on-site, in a building annexed to Bais Rochel.9
However, in 1985, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
"publicly funded classes on religious school premises violated the
Establishment Clause" of the Federal Constitution.1" This holding
2

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

The First Amendment provides in relevant part:

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." Id.
3

4

Grumet, 93 N.Y.2d at 683,720 N.E.2d at 67, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 847.

Id. at 689, 720 N.E.2d at 72, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 852. The court stated:

"Although Chapter 390 sets forth facially neutral criteria, any attempt to

characterize the statute as a religion-neutral law of general applicability is belied
by its actual effect." Id.
5 Id. at 694, 720 N.E.2d at 75, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
6 Id. at 697, 720 N.E.2d at 77, 697 N.Y.S.2d
at 857.
7 Id. at 683, 720 N.E.2d at 67, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 848. The Satmar Hasidic
Jews, a devoutly religious group, follow a strict interpretation of the Torah,
segregating the sexes outside the home and dressing in a distinctive manner. Id.
I Id., 720 N.E.2d at 68, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
9
10

Id.
Id. (citing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)).
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meant that the arrangement that then existed between the Kiryas
Joel parochial schools and the Monroe-Woodbury Central School
District could no longer continue." In order for their children to
receive special educational services, parents of the Kiryas Joel
community now had to send the children to public schools. 2
However, the practice was short-lived, as the Kiryas Joel children
appeared to experience problems adjusting to an environment so
drastically different from their own."3 An increasing number of
parents sought administrative review of Monroe-Woodbury's
decision to offer special education services only in public
schools.14 The public school district brought a "declaratory
judgement action, seeking a declaration that Education Law
§3602-c compelled it to furnish special education services only in
regular classes and programs in public schools and not
elsewhere."'" The New York Court of Appeals ruled that MonroeWoodbury was not compelled to provide the special education
services to the Kiryas Joel children in public schools. 6 However,
if Monroe-Woodbury were to provide special education services, it
could not do so in a segregated setting.' The school district was

Id In Aguilar, the Court reasoned that publicly funded classes on religious
school premises necessarily involved excessive entanglement between church
and state because the religious schools would have to tolerate the ongoing
presence of state personnel whose primary purpose would be to guard against
the "infiltration" of religious thought. See Aguilar,473 U.S. at 413.
12 Id.at 683,720 N.E.2d at 68, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
'" Id., 720 N.E.2d at 68, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 848. Specifically, parents refused to
continue the arrangement, concerned that their children were experiencing
trauma and fear at leaving their familiar community. Id.
14 Id. at 684, 720 N.E.2d at 68, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
15 Id. Education Law §3602-c provides in pertinent part: "Pupils enrolled in
nonpublic schools for whom services are provided pursuant to the provisions of
this section shall receive such services in regular classes of the public school and
shall not be provided such services separately from pupils regularly attending
the public schools." (Education Law §3602-c [9]).
16 Grumet, 93 N.Y.2d at 684, 720 N.E.2d at 68, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 848 (citing
Boardof Educ. ofMonroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174,
181,527 N.E.2d 767, 531 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1988)).
17 Id.
"
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simply required to "provide the special services at a site that was
reasonably accessible to Kiryas Joel's handicapped children."18
The New York Legislature attempted to resolve the controversy
between Kiryas Joel and the Monroe-Woodbury School District by
enacting Chapter 748 of the Laws of 1989, "which established a
union free school district coterminous with Kiryas Joel within the
boundaries of Monroe-Woodbury."' 9 The new school district
would be under the control of a Board of Education, "composed of
five to nine members elected by the qualified voters of the village
of Kiryas Joel, to serve for terms not exceeding five years., 2' The
New York Court of Appeals determined that the statute violated
the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution because it
constituted a "symbolic union of church and State," which would
be perceived by members of the Satmarer Hasidim as an
endorsement of their religion, and by other religious groups as
disapproval of theirs.2 ' This was a crucial violation of the second
prong of the most commonly applied test used by the United States
Supreme Court for government neutrality as established in Lemon
v. Kurtzman.'2 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the New York Court of Appeals, finding that the act
Id. (citing Monroe-Woodbury, 72 N.Y.2d 174, 184, 527 N.E.2d at 772, 531
N.Y.S.2d at 894 where the court determined that Education Law §3602-c [9]
18

was facially inconsistent with other laws on the same subject and should be read
in the light of its history and context).
'9Id. Chapter 748 of the Laws of 1989 provided in relevant part:
§ 1. The territory of the village of Kiryas Joel in the town of Monroe,
Orange County, on the date when this act shall take effect, shall be and
hereby is constituted a separate school district, and shall be known as the
Kiryas Joel village school district and shall have and enjoy all powers
and duties of a union free school district under the provisions of the
education law.
20 Chapter 748 of the Laws of 1989, §2.
2 Grumet v. Board of Educ. ofKiryas Joel Village School Dist., 81 N.Y.2d at
528 (N.Y. 1993), affid, Board of Educ. ofKiryas Joel Vii. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,

512 U.S. 687 (1994) (also known as Kiryas Joel1).
2 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). The Lemon test has three
cumulative criteria or prongs to determine government neutrality: the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion and it must not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion. Violation of any one of the three
prongs is sufficient to offend the Establishment Clause. Id.
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was "tantamount to an allocation of political power on a religious
criterion and neither presupposed nor required government
impartiality towards religion."z
After the Supreme Court decision, which came to be known as
Kiryas Joel I, the Legislature passed Chapter 241 of the Laws of
1994 which "set forth facially neutral criteria that a municipality
could satisfy in order to establish a school district, and delineated
the process by which the new school district could be formed." 4
The New York Court of Appeals held this new statute also violated
the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution. The court
reasoned that since Kiryas Joel was effectively the only group that
would benefit from the statute, and it was not a beneficiary that
existed within a broad range of potential beneficiaries, the new
statute also had the impermissible effect of advancing a religion
and therefore failed the second prong of the Lemon test.6
The New York Legislature made a third attempt to resolve the
Kiryas Joel controversy by enacting Chapter 390 of the Laws of
1997 . ' which the court also referred to as "The Kiryas Joel School
Bill."8
The bill delineated specific criteria by which a
municipality "situated wholly within one central or union free
school district but whose boundaries are not coterminous with
... [its] ... boundaries,"2 9 could establish its own district. The
statute prescribed that:

2 Grumet, 93 N.Y.2d at 685, 720 N.E.2d at 69, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 849 (quoting
Board of Educ. Of Kiryas Joel Vii. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. at 690

(1994)).
24 Id. at 685 (citing Grumet v. Cuomo, 90 N.Y.2d 57 (1997) (also known as
Kiryas JoelDI)).
' Grumet v. Cuomo, 90 N.Y.2d 57, 73-74, 681 N.E.2d 340, 348, 659
N.Y.S.2d 173, 181 (1997).
26 Id. at 72, 681 N.E.2d at 347, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 180. The Court noted that
because the statute limited its definition of a municipality to "towns or villages
in existence as of the effective date" of the statute, no other similarly situated
group would be able to derive benefit from it. Id.
27 N.Y. EDUC. LAv §3602 -c (McKinney 1995).
28 Grumet, 93 N.Y.2d at 686, 695, 720 N.E.2d at 70, 76, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 850,

856.
29

Id. at 686-687, 720 N.E.2d at 70, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
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(i) the new school district equal at least two thousand
children and that it be no greater than sixty percent of the
enrollment of the existing school district from which the
school district will be organized, (ii) the newly-formed
district have an actual valuation per total wealth pupil unit at
least equal to the State-wide average, and (iii) the enrollment
of the existing school district from which the new district is
formed equal at least two thousand children, excluding the
residents of the municipality.
The effect of the statute, in operation, was to benefit only two of
New York State's 1,545 municipalities - Kiryas Joel and the Town
of Stony Point. 31 Earlier in 1997, the United States Supreme Court
overturned its Aguilar v. Felton holding 32 when it decided Agostini
v. Felton,33 so the barrier that originally spawned the controversy
between Kiryas Joel and Monroe-Woodbury no longer existed.34
The claimants in the case at bar, Louis Grumet and Caroline
Shipley, as citizen taxpayers, challenged the constitutionality of
Chapter 390, 35 and commenced the subject action against New
York State Governor George Pataki and various other officials,
including those of the Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Union
Free School and Monroe-Woodbury. 36 Grumet's motion for
Id. at 687, 720 N.E.2d at 70, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
3l Id. at 689, 720 N.E.2d at 72, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 852. Under Chapter 390, only
the Village of Kiryas Joel and the Town of Stony Point could establish their own
school district.
32 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). In this case, the Court had held that
publicly funded classes on religiQus school premises violated the Establishment
30

Clause. This made it unconstitutional for Monroe Woodbury to provide on-site
schooling to Kiryas Joel's handicapped children. Id. at 414.
31 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); see also supra notes 8 and 9 and
accompanying text.
34 Grumet, 93 N.Y.2d at 697, 720 N.E.2d at 77, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 857. In other

words, Monroe-Woodbury was no longer prohibited from providing on-site
special educational services to Kiryas Joel's handicapped children. The court
alluded to this fact at the end of its opinion and encouraged the parties to do
what was best for the children, rather than prolong litigation. Id.
35 Id. at 687, 720 N.E.2d at 70, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
36 Id. Although not explicitly stated in Grumet, it can be inferred that the
claimants did not want to spend their taxes on what is essentially a private
school outfitted with public resources. Id.
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summary judgment was granted and the defendants were
permanently enjoined "from taking any and all present or future
action or expending any State monies or resources for the purpose
of implementing Chapter 390. . . ." The Appellate Division
unanimously affirmed the trial court's ruling, finding that Chapter
390 failed the second prong of the Lemon test because it was not a
"truly religious-neutral law of general applicability ....
"'
Furthermore, the Appellate Division concluded that Chapter 390
failed the second prong of the Lemon test because it extended an
impermissible preference to Kiryas Joel by facilitating the
Satmar's desire to provide their handicapped children with special
education services in an exclusive Satmar environment.39 In
agreeing with the plaintiffs, the Appellate Division noted further
that with the United States Supreme Court's overruling of Aguilar,
Chapter 390 should be perceived as "yet another improper
endorsement" of the Satmar community by the Legislature.' The
defendants appealed.4 '
The Court of Appeals began its analysis of Chapter 390 by
referring to the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution. 4
It provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion."43
This neutrality
requirement prevents State or Federal Governments from
"pass[ing] laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another."' The court applied the "form and
r7 id.

Id. at 687, 720 N.E.2d at 71, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 851 (citing Grumet v. Pataki,
244 A.D.2d 31, 36, 675 N.Y.S.2d 662 (quoting Grumet v. Cuomo, 90 N.Y.2d at
70, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 179, 681 N.E.2d at 346)).
39 Id. at 688,720 N.E.2d at 71, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
38

40id.
41 I'1

Id.
I U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in relevant part:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." Id.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). The Everson court
upheld the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that authorized a township
board of education to reimburse parents for money expended for the public
transportation of their children to schools. Parents of children who attended
Catholic parochial schools were among those reimbursed. Despite the court's
42
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effect test" 45 it adopted from the United States Supreme Court
when the former court decided Grumet v. Cuomo.16 The court
found that though Chapter 390 set forth facially neutral criteria and
was therefore neutral in form, that when its effect was subjected to
similar scrutiny,0the statute clearly failed constitutional review.47
Only two municipalities in the State of New York could benefit
under Chapter 390 - Kiryas Joel and the Town of Stony Point, a
direct result of-the fact that the qualifying criteria of the statute
were consciously drawn to benefit Kiryas Joel. 8 Because of this
limiting effect, the court observed that Chapter 390 was no more
neutral than its unconstitutional predecessor, Chapter 241 of the
Laws of 1994. 49
The court looked to Federal law and noted that the United States
Supreme Court had not abandoned the Lemon test, although it has
questioned it in recent years." The court distinguished the subject
case from Agostini v. Felton, in which the Supreme Court reviewed
whether the placement of public school employees in parochial
statement that the wall between church and state should be 'high and
impregnable,' it nevertheless found that New Jersey had not violated the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 18.
s Rosenbergerv. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995).
46 Grumet v. Cuomo, 90 N.Y.2d at 70, 681 N.E.2d at 34, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 179.
4 Grumet v. Pataki,93 N.Y.2d at 689, 720 N.E.2d at 72, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
The court adopted the Supreme Court's form and effect approach used in Walz
v. Tax. Comm'n. of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The basic
proposition is that if the statute can survive neutrality scrutiny in both form and
effect then it is beyond Establishment Clause reproach.
48 Id. at 690, 720 N.E.2d at 72, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 852. The court noted that the
non-neutral effect was to secure "a public school" for one religious community,
whereas other religious communities would not be afforded the same benefit
under the statute. Id.
"9 Id. at 690. The court observed further that although the objectionable
criteria of Chapter 241 had been eliminated, the eligibility requirements under
Chapter 390 provided for a virtually exclusive flow of benefits to Kiryas Joel.
Id. at 691,720 N.E.2d at 72-73,697 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
so Id. at 691, 720 N.E.2d at 73, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 853. The court identified
several cases showing that the Supreme Court has continued to apply the
tripartite test of Lemon v. Kurtzman in the majority of cases, although it has used
a number of tests. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); County of
Allegheny v. American Civ. Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Marsh v. Chambers,463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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schools resulted in the impermissible effect of advancing religion
and resolved the question in the negative.'
In Agostini, the
Court's "effects inquiry" involved a determination as to whether
the presence of public school teachers necessarily had the
impermissible effect of advancing religion. The Court examined
whether the public school teachers' presence resulted in religious
indoctrination, creating an "excessive entanglement" or "symbolic
union" between church and State.' The Court reasoned that a
program benefitting a broad spectrum of disadvantaged children,
from both secular and religious schools, could not be viewed as an
endorsement of religion. In Grumet, however, it was clear that one
religious community was to benefit from the proposed legislation,
Kiryas Joel.5 More strikingly, the Court of Appeals found that the
present case did not fall into the two usual categories of
Establishment Clause cases.' "This was neither a case in which
the questionable statute provided public aid to a parochial school,
nor one in which it prescribed religious practices for a public
school, but rather a unique case in which a religious group was
delegated governmental power to form its own school district."'
Therefore, the type of "effects inquiry" required in order to
determine the neutrality of Chapter 390, according to the Court of
Appeals, would not involve focusing on whether the statute
advanced religion, but whether the statute provided an
impermissible accommodation, which was the approach taken in
Kiryas Joel L56 Essentially, the court viewed the two approaches
as "both sides of [the same] coin," since either would declare
unconstitutional a statute that benefits virtually a single religious
group, and fails to make the same benefits available to other
similarly situated groups'
The court also applied its prior reasoning, again adopted from
the Supreme Court, that a statute designed to accommodate a
51 Agostini v. Felton,521 U.S. 203 (1997).
52
3

5

Id. at 227-235.
Grumet v. Pataki,93 N.Y.2d at 690,720 N.E.2d at 72,697 N.Y.S.2d at 852.

Id at 692, 720 N.E.2d at 74, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 854.

5

id.

56

Id. at 693,720 N.E.2d at 74, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 854.

57

Id. at 694, 720 N.E.2d at 75, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
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religious group should not be viewed automatically as advancing
religion, so long as the secular effect is distinct from its religious
impact and the beneficiary class is broad. 8 The court also
followed New York State precedent, adopting the corollary to the
Supreme Court's index of secular effect, proffering that a valid
index of nonsecular effect would inhere in the provision of a
governmental benefit to a restricted class.5 9
Finally, the court seemed ultimately persuaded by the claimants
that since Agostini provided a constitutionally viable alternative
prior to the enactment of Chapter 390, the enactment should indeed
be viewed as an advancement of religion, because the Satmar
Hasidim, as well as other religious groups would perceive the
statute as giving preferential treatment to one religious sect.'
Drawing from both federal and state precedents, and ultimately
persuaded by the claimants' arguments in view of Agostini, the
Court of Appeals could not but conclude that Chapter 390 not only
constituted an impermissible accommodation, but also had the
primary effect of advancing a religion.6
The dissenting opinion62 offered three arguments for the
preservation of Chapter 390's constitutionality.6 3 First, the
presumption of constitutionality afforded every enactment of
Legislature;' second, the lack of any persisting or new
constitutional faults under presently governing Establishment

5' Id. at 695, 720 N.E.2d at 76, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 856. Tie court stated: "In
other words, a permissible accommodation must honor the principle of
neutrality as among religions." (interpretingWalz v. Tax Comm 'n of City of New

York, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)).
59 Grumet v. Cuomo, 90 N.Y.2d 57, 70, 681 N.E.2d 340, 346, 659 N.Y.S.2d
173, 179 (citing Rosenbergerv. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819

(1995).
6o Grumet v. Pataki,93 N.Y.2d at 696-697, 720 N.E.2d at 77, 697 N.Y.S.2d at
857.
61 Id.
62

Id. at 697, 720 N.E.2d at 77, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 857 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).

63

Id.

64 See generally Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trustfor Cultural Resources, 46 N.Y.2d

358, 385 N.E.2d 1284, 413 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1978).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss2/27

10

des Etages: Grumet v Pataki

2000

ESTABLISHMENT OFRELIGION

577

Clause jurisprudence;6 and third, the explicit removal from
Chapter 390 of previously adjudicated constitutional defects.'
The first argument rested on the minority's disagreement with
the majority's prudential approach in analyzing the statute. The
minority argued that since policy considerations were entrusted by
the Constitution to the Legislature, and not the Judiciary, the
presumption that an act of Legislature is constitutional should
control unless rebutted by proof "persuasive beyond a reasonable
doubt."'67 The minority also emphasized that public funding
programs designed to address modem, real-life problems should be
respected unless "patently illegal."' 3
The second argument casts doubt on the majority's refusal to
accept a facially neutral statute in view of the evolving
jurisprudence in Establishment Clause law. Specifically, the
Supreme Court's suggestion that a district created under a
generally applicable scheme would be acceptable even if it
operated to correspond with a specific religious group led the
minority to vote against the majority. 69
The third argument accused the majority of changing its criteria
for satisfying the neutrality requirement of the Establishment
Clauses, thereby revealing the "slippery slope nature of the
invalidation test." 70 Here, the minority criticized the majority for
not considering the statute constitutional even though the
Legislature had removed the objectionable elements of the statute.
In sum, a comparison of federal and state law in the area of
Establishment Clause cases reveals several similarities as well as

6

See Grumet, 93 N.Y.2d. at 696-97, 720 N.E.2d at 77, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 857.

61 Id.at 701,720 N.E.2d at 80, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 860 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).

The dissent states that the defects of Chapter 390 were cured at the court's
"explicit suggestion." Id.
67 Id at 697, 720 N.E.2d at 78, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 858 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting)
(citing Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trust for Cultural Resources of City of N. Y., 46
N.Y.2d 358,370,473 N.Y.S.2d 357,385 N.E.2d 1284 [citations omitted] ).
6 Id. at 698, 720 N.E.2d at 78, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 858 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 700, 720 N.E.2d at 80, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 860 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
The minority was referring to a comment by Justice O'Connor to that effect in
KiryasJoel 1, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1993).
70 Grumet at 703, 720 N.E.2d at 82, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 862 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
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the consistency of Grumet v. Pataki with state and federal
precedent. Both the federal and state courts look to the form as
well as the effect of the statute before passing upon its neutrality.
Both the federal and state courts continue to apply the Lemon test
to determine whether the statute has an impermissible effect. Both
federal and state courts regard the broadness of the applicability of
the statute as a valid index of secular effect. Grumet, in a sense,
gave New York State an opportunity to re-articulate concepts
implicit in the federal jurisprudence. Namely, that in addition to
advancement of religion under the second prong of the Lemon test,
an accommodation whose secular effect is inseparable from its
religious impact is also impermissible under the federal
constitution. Moreover, when the beneficiary class of the proposed
legislation is narrow, such narrowness constitutes a valid index of
nonsecular effect.
Anthea M des Etages
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